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Abstract
Unrealistic optimism is a well documented phenomenon. This paper argues
that it is important in many economic contexts. Focussing on start-up finance
for businesses, optimism may be responsible for or consistent with features such as
credit rationing or redlining that are normally taken as symptoms of under-provision
of finance requiring intervention to expand lending. Optimism leads to the opposite
conclusion, at least if it is legitimate to use fiscal policy to counteract systematic
error. The paper reports on an experiment in which, due to optimism, the lower
the prizes to entrepreneurial activity the higher the subjects income.
∗We are grateful to Simon Parker, Alfons Weichenrieder and an anonymous referee for very helpful
comments.
“The overweening conceit which the greater part of men have of their abilities is an
ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages......The chance of gain
is by every man more or less overvalued and the chance of loss by most men undervalued
and by scarce any man valued more than it is worth.”
Adam Smith (1776)
"...there must come into play the diversity among men in degree of confidence in their
judgement and powers and disposition to act upon their opinion to "venture"..."
Frank Knight (1921)
1. Introduction
There is considerable consensus among economists and policy makers that there is fail-
ure in the market for loans, especially those for new businesses. Even more remarkably,
there is agreement about the direction of the failure: lending should be increased from
the laissez-faire level. This paper challenges this view, invoking ideas from The Wealth of
Nations. Adam Smith was convinced that entrepreneurs display the trait for which mod-
ern psychologists have coined the pleonasm ‘unrealistic optimism’. Most entrepreneurs
overestimate their chance of success. If unrealistic optimism is indeed pervasive, policies
which encourage lending are called into question. Should governments really be luring
people to ruin themselves?
Economists typically sidestep such issues by assuming that individuals are the best
judges of their own interests. Burgeoning evidence of numerous cognitive biases make this
a questionable foundation for welfare economics. Only recently has there been sustained
discussion of the normative implications of self-harm and mechanisms to discourage it
(see e.g. O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2003; Camerer et al., 2003; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003).
This paper focuses on the public finance implications of a well documented bias with
potentially important consequences.
Most economists have an instinctive distrust of “paternalistic” intervention. Demon-
strating that systematically irrational private behavior prevails is certainly not enough
to justify corrective policy. The danger lies in providing governments with a ready made
excuse to adopt corrupt and destructive policies based on unsubstantiated hunch. Even
if politicians are not self seeking they too may be prone to unrealistic optimism in be-
lieving that they can improve matters (Glaeser, 2003). A reasonably innocuous policy
recommendation is that accurate information should be provided so as to allow “correct”
choices to be made. Yet the reasons that lead to initial error may make people immune
to education, as the experimental results reported here do indeed suggest.
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The perspective of this paper is that identifiable cognitive biases create distortions
which may be much the most important source of eﬃciency loss in the economic system. In
remedying the eﬃciency problem the standard theory of tax/subsidy policy is in principle
applicable. The implication is that start-up finance should be taxed. We go no further
than advocating that subsidies are withdrawn, thereby avoiding slippery slope arguments.
Even to go this far represents a major change in government policy. In the US, the
Small Business Administration (SBA), a government agency, has provided loan guarantees
to small businesses since 1953. In 1997 Congress passed an SBA funding bill providing
over $50 billion for the SBA’s business loan programs.1
It is not just the US. Most governments think it meritorious that more people set
up new businesses. The UK Government has announced “A new drive to boost the
enterprise culture, encourage more people to set up their own business and reduce the
barriers facing start-up firms ...particularly [amongst] under-represented groups, such as
women, ethnic minorities and [in] disadvantaged parts of the country.” (Department of
Trade and Industry, 2002a). The European Commission has recently published a Green
Paper on “Entrepreneurship in Europe” (2003). The aim is to encourage more people to
become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship is seen as “first and foremost a mindset” (p.5)
although the importance of unrealistic optimism is not mentioned. Psychology aside, it
is reported that “Access to finance remains a major barrier for new entrepreneurs” (p.
11) and schemes to overcome this, such as the UK Governments Loan Guarantee Scheme
to small businesses, are praised. The latter scheme is set to back some 5000 loans per
year, targeted towards borrowers that banks would otherwise have rejected (Department
of Trade and Industry, 2002b)
Policies of this sort reflect a view that “. . . lack of capital holds back millions of poten-
tially entrepreneurial people in the industrial countries.” (Blanchflower et al.,2001, p690).
Economists’ support for intervention is much influenced by theories of informational fric-
tions in credit markets. Most notably, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explained credit rationing
on the basis of asymmetric information. Their story is that if banks increase interest rates
too much, bank lending may become less profitable. There are two reasons for this. As
interest rates rise, entrepreneurs with safe projects tend to be the first to drop out. A safe
project is solvent in most states, so the expected realised cost to the entrepreneur of the
extra repayment is high. Risky projects with a small chance of yielding the entrepreneur
a bonanza typically have higher chances of complete failure. The high default probability
1In addition the Community Reinvestment Act provides banks with incentives for lending to small
businesses in low-income areas.
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means the expected cost to the entrepreneur of an interest rate rise is low. So, if entre-
preneurs are approximately risk neutral, banks unable to judge whether an entrepreneur
has a risky or safe project will find that beyond a certain point expected repayments
fall as the interest rate increases. Reinforcing this selection eﬀect is an incentive eﬀect.
Suppose all entrepreneurs are identical but once they are granted a loan, they have a
choice whether to implement a safe or a risky project. The bank knows this option exists
for the entrepreneur but can do little to eﬀectively monitor the choice. It could be that
very risky projects deliver lower expected gross revenue but that does not prevent rational
entrepreneurs from picking them. As previously explained, the risky projects have lower
expected repayments so may be more advantageous to the borrower even though they
also have lower expected returns. Moreover, the diﬀerence in the expected repayment
between a safe and a risky project is greater when interest rates are high. As a result,
higher interest rates may induce borrowers to switch to riskier projects. This increases
the banks’ default rate, perhaps by so much that their expected repayment eventually
falls as rates rise.
Consider now the interest rate that maximises the banks’ expected revenue per loan.
There will be an associated rate that if paid to depositors results in the banks just breaking
even. Yet if the banking system faces an upward sloping supply of deposits there may
not be enough funds forthcoming to make loans to all the entrepreneurs applying. In
response to excess demand it is usually profitable for sellers to raise price. Not so here.
The selection and incentive eﬀects mean that an increase in the interest rate lowers bank
profitability (so too would a reduction in the interest rate). Banks therefore make as
many loans as they can, randomly selecting which entrepreneurs receive them. This is the
famous credit-rationing result. Applicants denied credit are nearly all willing to pay higher
than quoted interest rates and as a group are no diﬀerent to those obtaining funding.
There has been little evidence of credit rationing in this sense (e.g. Berger and Udell,
1992 and Parker, 2002) but redlining, a related phenomenon, is widespread. Suppose
that it is possible to observe that an individual belongs to a group, say those living in
a particular area. The bank cannot tell much about the characteristics of individual
loan applicants but does know the distribution of characteristics of those in the area.
It is therefore possible to draw up a group-specific relationship between the interest rate
charged by the banks and the expected revenue per loan. As before, selection and incentive
eﬀects may mean that the relationship is not monotonic and at its turning point the
expected return per loan may not be enough to allow the banks to attract depositors. If so,
no one applying from this area may be granted a loan. They are “redlined”. Those living
in an adjacent area may have a slightly more profitable distribution of characteristics,
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good enough to bring the maximum revenue per loan above the cost of granting it. So,
in the first area it is impossible to get a loan at any interest rate but in the second,
only minimally diﬀerent in the composition of borrowers, loans may be available at quite
low rates. Moreover, in the redlined zone, the expected surplus per applicant at the
maximising interest rate may be large. So if the group is only just redlined, a negligible
financial subsidy can generate considerable welfare gain. This redlining analysis does not
depend on the supply of deposits being upward sloping.
The observable characteristic could be wealth rather than geographical area. There
is an incentive for entrepreneurs to provide maximum self-finance or post all available
assets as collateral. Doing so limits moral hazard which brings down interest rates more
than proportionately. In addition, entrepreneurs with safe projects are willing to accept
a smaller cut in the interest rate for a given increase in self-finance. So self-finance is a
signalling device and not investing own wealth in the project is a poor message to send to
the bank. The redlining analysis can therefore be applied to groups identified by wealth
(which is posted as collateral). It is not that low-wealth borrowers are charged more for
finance it is simply unavailable to them.2
There is a host of evidence consistent with redlining on the basis of wealth. Holtz-Eakin
et al. (1994a, 1994b), Evans and Leighton (1989), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) among many others, find that wealth increases the propensity
to become self-employed, even after controlling for the possible correlation between entre-
preneurial ability and wealth. Bond and Townsend (1996) report that in a low-income,
primarily Mexican neighborhood in Chicago, only 11.5 percent of business owners financed
their start-up with a bank loan, while 50 percent of the respondents financed their start-up
entirely out of their own funds.
The widespread practice of credit scoring is direct evidence of redlining with respect
to other factors. Banks attach weights to individual characteristics and only grant loans
if the overall mix is suﬃciently good. In most places it is illegal to use characteristics
such as race or gender but it remains controversial whether this occurs in practice (e.g.
Munnell, et. al. 1996, Blanchflower et. al. 2003; Ross and Tootell, 2004).
The now standard theory thus accounts for some of the key facts of credit markets
and provides a justification for intervention on eﬃciency grounds.3 Part of the appeal
2Of course lower wealth requires larger loans, but raising the repayment in proportion does not bring
in compensating revenue. First, moral hazard is greater. Second, with less of their own wealth at stake,
lower-quality entrepreneurs apply. So a high-wealth group that it is just viable to lend to is no longer so
if its members experience a fall in wealth.
3It is not always true that asymmetric information leads to under-lending. De Meza and Webb (1987)
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of the model is that remedial policies designed to bring excluded groups into the market
are likely to yield distributional as well as eﬃciency gains. Yet if optimism replaces
rational expectations, all the policy conclusions change. The observational properties of
the model are unchanged; credit rationing, redlining and related phenomena still arise.
The diﬀerence is that entrepreneurs wanting loans but failing to obtain them may be
better oﬀ than those receiving loans. Policies directed towards increasing lending, in
particular those focussed on excluded borrowers, such as loan guarantee schemes may be
particularly harmful.
The next section of the paper reviews psychological evidence for unrealistic optimism
and findings which suggest that it is important in entrepreneurial settings. Then a model
is built which justifies our claims concerning the positive and normative implications of
optimism. This shows that taxing lending may directly raise welfare and that a statutory
exemption on the assets that can be claimed by the creditor in the event of default may
be beneficial. Section 4 contains a summary of an experimental credit market in which
the extent and implications of optimism can be precisely determined. The gains from
discouraging lending are large and selection eﬀects are inconsistent with standard models.
Subjects act on their beliefs but their beliefs are unrelated to the truth. This may also help
to explain recent diﬃculties in finding evidence of asymmetric information in insurance
markets. Finally, conclusions are drawn.
2. The Psychology of Optimism
2.1. The Meaning and Measurement of Unrealistic Optimism
“According to popular belief, people tend to think that they are invulnerable. They
expect others to be victims of misfortune, not themselves” (Weinstein 1980, p. 806). This
hopeful outlook on life implies “an error in judgement” which Weinstein called unrealistic
optimism or optimistic bias. The terms unique invulnerability (Perloﬀ, 1983) and positive
illusions (Taylor and Brown, 1988) are also applied to describe similar phenomena. What
is referred to is an underestimation of the likelihood of experiencing negative events and
an overestimation of the probability of experiencing positive events. Put alternatively,
expectations are irrational so the mean forecast error is significantly diﬀerent from zero.
show that if entrepreneurs diﬀer in ability rather than intrinsic risk there is too much lending. In a
pooling equilibrium the able types cross-subsidise the less able who are consequently induced to enter
though they would not do so under full information. When moral hazard is added this overlending result
is consistent with credit rationing and wealth dependency of lending (de Meza and Webb 1999, 2000).
6
The evidence is that optimistic biases are robust and widespread whilst pessimistic biases
are relatively rare.
Unrealistic optimism is then distinct from risk preference, the willingness to take
gambles at given odds. Furthermore, being unrealistic optimistic, is not the same as
being overconfident. The latter is also a positive illusion, but it refers to an excessive
precision in forecasting, i.e. confidence intervals are too narrow.
The direct measure of unrealistic optimism is (minus) the diﬀerence between an indi-
vidual’s subjective estimate of the probability of a (bad) good event occurring and the
true value of the probability. Few psychological studies attempt to measure unrealistic
optimism, firstly, because of the diﬃculty in determining the accurate probability for a
particular individual and secondly, because of the diﬃculty individuals have in under-
standing and providing probabilities (Gigerenzer, 2002; Weinstein & Klein, 1996). In-
stead, the usual approach is to investigate whether people think an event is more or less
likely to happen to them than to their peers; a comparative rather than absolute measure.
A vast amount of evidence supports the existence of optimistic biases. Among many
other positive events, most students think they have a better chance than their peers of
liking a job, owning their own home, and having a high starting salary. Drinking problems,
suﬀering a heart attack before age 40, divorce a few years after marriage, being fired from a
job and not finding another within 6 months are all rated as more likely to occur to others
in their peer group (Weinstein, 1980). Typical is the finding of Guthree, Rachlinski and
Wistrich, 2001, that in a gathering of US judges 90% thought their decisions less likely to
be reversed than the median reversal probabability of those present. The optimistic biases
are not limited to questionnaire responses concerning remote events, but are also present
in real, immediate and visually vivid risky situations, such as novice bungee jumpers who
perceive their own risk of injury to be less than the risk of the typical bungee jumper
(Harris et al., 1996). Evidence also exists on men who have tested seropositive for the
HIV virus who are actually more optimistic about not developing AIDS than men who
have tested seronegative for the virus (Taylor et al., 1992). Similarly, studies aimed at
analyzing the progress of the degree of optimism after an experience with a stressful event
(such as earthquakes or exposure to intense radiation) show that the positive illusion that
the stressful negative event is more likely to happen to others than to oneself tends to
return after a relatively short period of time (Burger and Palmer, 1992).
Despite its potential importance for policy, there is much less research on absolute op-
timism. Fischoﬀ Slovic and Lichenstein (1977) and Lichtenstein, Fischhoﬀ and Phillips,
(1982) find people considerably over-estimate the probability their answers are correct
by some 50%. Weinstein et al. (1996) examined the accuracy of personal risk estimates
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of college students for hazards such as pneumonia, suicide, motor vehicle accident, di-
vorce, obesity, and pregnancy. Optimism was the norm. Strecher et al. (1995) report
on 2,785 patients completing a questionnaire including a health risk appraisal and ques-
tions regarding smoking behaviour and perceived health risks of heart attack, cancer, and
stroke. While most smokers accurately perceived their health risks to be greater than
non-smokers, smokers were also more likely to underestimate their health risks.
2.2. Determinants of optimism
Weinstein’s (1980) pioneer study examined a range of positive and negative real life events
that might occur sometime in the future to determine the extent of optimistic biases and
the conditions under which they occur. It seems that two conditions must be fulfilled
for the optimistic bias to arise: (1) the event is perceived as controllable (i.e. there are
things one can do or contemplate doing to influence the event) and (2) people have some
degree of commitment or emotional investment in the outcome. In both cases the desire
to protect self-esteem may be at work.
In addition to these self-serving biases, there are other systematic errors that give
rise to optimism in identifiable circumstances. There is evidence (Weinstein et al., 1996)
supporting Kahneman and Slovic’s theories on people’s tendencies to overestimate small
probabilities and to underestimate large ones. When the events in question are respec-
tively good and bad, optimism is the result. Furthermore, Weinstein (1980) finds that
unfamiliarity with a contingency breeds optimism with the correlation stronger for nega-
tive hazards.
Straightforward cognitive error is a further source of optimism. Most people taking
psychometric tests know they are noisy. Even with no prior view of how they diﬀer from
the population they take their actual score as the best point estimate despite scores above
the mean being more likely to be biased upwards and those below downwards. Such base
rate neglect leads people with above average experience to be optimists (de Meza and
Southey,1996 Landier and Thesmar, 2003).
2.3. Entrepreneurial optimism
The factors just discussed suggest that business start-ups are incubators of optimism.
Firstly, entrepreneurs typically have most of their personal wealth tied up in the business
so that their degree of commitment or emotional investment in the outcome is extremely
high and hence they tend to be especially optimistic about the result. Secondly, individ-
uals are more optimistic about outcomes they believe are under their control and setting
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up a business is certainly an activity in which an illusion of control is likely to be felt.
Thirdly, there is evidence that people tend to overweight unlikely events and underweight
likely ones (e.g. Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). As only some 30% of new businesses make
it through 5 years, failure is a high-risk event and so one would expect positive illusions
to be widespread. Finally, since starting a new business is inevitably uncharted territory
there is scope for unchecked fantasizing and optimism is more likely.
Positive illusions do indeed seem to impact on economic decision making in general4,
and in the entrepreneurial setting in particular. Here we summarize some relevant findings
on start-ups.
There is striking evidence on the discrepancy between financial returns to self-employment
and to paid employment, yet entrepreneurs are not dissuaded. The U.S. Small Business
Administration (1997) found that one-sixth of self-employed individuals earn less than
the minimum wage. On the face of it this might reflect people being forced into self-
employment due to low skills. Hamilton (2000) shows though that even controlling for a
wide variety of characteristics, entrepreneurs enter and persist in business despite the fact
that they have both lower initial earnings and lower earnings growth than they could have
achieved in paid employment. It is unlikely this is due to selection eﬀects since the prior
wage distribution of those becoming self-employed does not appear to be significantly
diﬀerent from that of paid employment stayers. Nonpecuniary benefits could be part of
the explanation but entrepreneurs are sacrificing substantial earnings lending plausibility
to the notion that misperceptions are implicated.
The evidence of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) is similar. They find that the
return on family businesses is no better than on public equity but the risk is far greater.
Unrealistic optimism is one of five possible explanations given by Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen to explain the seemingly perverse exposure to greater risk uncompensated by
higher returns.
Looking at innovation by independent inventors, Åstebro (2003) reports even more
striking commitment to loss making ventures. The chance of innovations reaching the
market is approximately 7%. Of the “lucky” 7%, some 60% realise negative returns and
the average realised return among those that commercialise their inventions is minus 7%,
even ignoring the cost of the inventor’s often enormous eﬀort. Many inventors persist in
4One of the earliest applications of optimism to economics was to corporate takeovers. Roll (1986)
argues that hubris on the part of executives of acquiring firms explains why M&As typically destroy
value. Malmendier and Tate (2002) test this idea showing that directors in acquiring companies increase
their equity stake during M&As despite such stock under-performing the market.
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trying to bring their ideas to market despite receiving good advice that the prospect of
making money is negligible, calling into question the rationality of entry decisions.
An ingenious experiment by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) sheds light on the implications
of optimistic illusions for entry decisions when all that matters is relative performance.
Their subjects must choose whether to enter a tournament or take a fixed payment. Fewer
participate in the tournament when winners are determined randomly from amongst the
entrants than when determined by relative performance on a quiz. Rationality suggests
the opposite should occur if people have any information about their relative ability at the
quiz. Most subjects who enter think the total profit earned by all entrants will be negative,
but their own profit will be positive. When subjects are told that quiz performance will
be important excess entry further increases. These self-selected subjects seem to neglect
the fact that they are competing with a reference group of subjects who all think they
are skilled too ("reference group neglect").5
Consistently with these results, in a sample of some 3,000 entrepreneurs, Cooper,
Woo,and Dunkelberg (1988) report that 81% believed their chance of success to be at
least 70% and 33% believed their chance to be a certain 100%. Only 39% think that any
business like theirs is likely to succeed.
Pinfold (2001) reports on the returns actual business founders in New Zealand expect
and the level of risk they believe they are taking. His survey shows that in the eyes of New
Zealand’s entrepreneurs, starting a new business is an attractive proposition: considerable
financial rewards coupled with many additional advantages (nonpecuniary benefits such
as independence, personal development, and employment). Furthermore, while realizing
that there are risks involved, these entrepreneurs tend to underrate the risk and have
faith in their personal ability to overcome the odds. They prefer to lay the blame for
failure on the incompetence of the participants rather than regarding failure as a likely
consequence of inescapable risk. The sampled New Zealand business founders consistently
believed the probability of their venture failing to be less than half the historical rate6 and
they estimated rewards that were considerably higher than those obtained by business in
general. The survey results show then that the high degree of unrealistic optimism about
returns and about the ability to beat the odds provides an explanation for the oversupply
of new ventures, which will result in very high rates of failure.
5Larwood and Whittaker (1977) report on students and executives playing a marketing game. Most
subjects think their chance of winning exceeds the average but it is not directly shown that these beliefs
drive entry.
6Entrepreneurs rated the chances of their business surviving its first five years at 75.7%, which was
23.5% higher than they rated the chances of other similar start-ups.
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Further evidence on self-employed expectations is supplied by Arabsheibani et al.
(2000). They surveyed the answers to the following two questions from the British House-
hold Panel Study:
1. “Would you say that you yourself are better oﬀ, worse oﬀ or about the same financially
than a year ago?”
2. “Looking ahead, how do you think you yourself will be financially a year from now,
better than you are now, worse oﬀ than now or about the same?”
The authors find that the self-employed expect better financial outcomes than employees
but experience worse realizations. For the self-employed the ratio of those making opti-
mistic errors (realization below forecast) to pessimistic errors (realization above forecast)
is 2.13 whereas for employees the corresponding figure is 1.55. Somewhat similar results
are found by Landier and Thasmar (2003) for a sample of French entrepreneurs.
2.4. The survival value of optimism
Use of systematically wrong probabilities impairs decisions so must optimists eventually
be driven out by realists? There are reasons why optimism benefits the individual, at least
at some point in evolutionary history. Even in equilibrium, evolution does not necessarily
lead to a population of rational agents who revise their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule.
There may be better uses of limited brain capacity, or there may be a stable equilibrium
in which oﬀsetting dysfunctional adaptations survive.
Waldman (1994) shows that the potential stability of second-best adaptations in a
world of sexual inheritance provides a possible explanation for why a propensity to sys-
tematic error may persist. According to Waldman, the unique first-best adaptation is
for males to accurately estimate their own abilities and receive no disutility from eﬀort,
nevertheless a second-best adaptation (i.e., an adaptation such that a trait is optimal
taking as fixed the value of the other trait) may arise. Consider a male who receives
disutility from eﬀort. If this individual estimates his abilities accurately, he would choose
an eﬀort level that is smaller than the one that maximizes his accumulation of wealth.
Overestimating abilities oﬀsets this "distortion" since, with appropriate functional forms
the individual’s incentive to apply eﬀort increases. The individual is pushed away from
utility maximization and towards wealth maximization.
Bernardo and Welch (2001) invoke group selection.7 They argue that entrepreneurs
buck trends and this is socially valuable. They then show that since groups with some op-
7Sinn and Weichenrieder (1993) discuss biological foundations for risk preferences from this perspec-
tive.
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timistic individuals have an evolutionary advantage over groups without such individuals
this may be enough for the trait to survive.
Optimism may confer private strategic advantages. As we show in Section 3, optimists
may apply more eﬀort than realists. This is no bad thing as debt or equity contracts create
a moral-hazard problem leading to the undersupply of eﬀort. So if optimism is observable,
competitive markets will reward it with higher payoﬀs. A similar story applies if team
production is important. With the contribution of individuals diﬃcult to measure there
is a tendency towards free-riding. Optimists, overestimating the eﬀectiveness of their
eﬀort, will oﬀset this eﬀect and will thus be more sought after as team members. Again
if optimism is identifiable, it need not be a liability. It may be that in hunter-gatherer
society, where social groups are small, aspects of character such as optimism become
known though optimism is not so well adapted to the larger societies of today. A further
evolutionary possibility is that in attracting mates it is important (especially for males)
to oﬀer prospects of future material success. Really believing in the truth of claims is the
best way to persuade others. Hence, optimism may be a good reproductive strategy even
if it actually impairs future material success. If so women’s best response is to excel in
the psychology necessary to detect false claims.
Somewhat similarly, in competitive situations observable optimism may amount to a
precommitment to higher output, an aggressive strategy. As long as rivals are producing
strategic substitutes this boosts payoﬀs. Heifetz & Spiegel (2001) develop an explanation
for unrealistic optimism along these lines.
3. Modelling Credit-Market Optimism
This section builds a simple model showing that optimism helps explain the major empir-
ical regularities of business-loan markets whilst turning the usual policy prescriptions on
their head.8 Not only does optimism aﬀect the entry decision, it may also impact on the
subsequent running of the business through its influence on strategic decisions and the
choice of eﬀort. Overrating the eﬀectiveness of their input creates a substitution eﬀect
inducing entrepreneurs’ to raise their eﬀort. In addition, there is an analogue of an income
eﬀect whereby the entrepreneur believes that their talent is such that only a little input is
needed to achieve all that can reasonably be done. The specification chosen here implies
8de Meza and Southey (1996), Niehans (1997), Manove and Padilla (1999) all follow Smith in suggest-
ing that entrepreneurs will be drawn disproportionately from the “super optimists” but address diﬀerent
questions and do not integrate the moral hazard and optimism.
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that eﬀort increases (for some evidence that this is the sign of the eﬀect see Landier and
Thesmar, 2003). Optimism may also result in the choice of high risk strategies that lower
expected returns though this will not be modelled.9
It is initially assumed that entrepreneurs are identical in their objective capacities but
diﬀer in their optimism. This leads to variations in entry decisions and in eﬀort choices.
The case of heterogeneous ability is then discussed.
The structure of the model is that there are many risk-neutral banks and many risk-
neutral potential borrowers. Each potential entrepreneur has a project which yields H if
successful, zero otherwise. For simplicity, H is independent of the number of successful
entrepreneurs, as might be the case when output is sold on the world market or when
each entrepreneur serves his own market niche.
The objective success probability, P (e), depends on non-verifiable eﬀort e:
P (e) = ae (3.1)
where a is a constant representing "ability". Entrepreneurs diﬀer in their opinion on the
eﬀectiveness of their eﬀort and perceive their (subjective) probability of success as
p(e) = aλe (3.2)
where λ is uniformly distributed on [1, 2]. So all potential entrepreneurs are optimists but
believe themselves to be realists. This formulation implies that eﬀort and optimism are
complements i.e. an entrepreneur perceives a higher marginal eﬀect of his eﬀort on his
success probability the higher his degree of optimism.
The cost of eﬀort is given by C(e) = e2/2. Each project requires capital input K.
Entrepreneurs have initial wealthW (< K). External finance is in the form of a standard
bank loan. One explanation for debt as the equilibrium form of finance follows from
optimism. Suppose project realisation is verifiable. Since every entrepreneur perceives the
probability of the H outcome to be greater than does the bank, the equilibrium contract
minimises repayment in the H state, a debt contract (see de Meza and Southey,1996,
Manove and Padilla,1999, Heaton, 2002, Hackbarth, 2002, and Landier and Thesmar,
2003). Alternatively, if project outcome is not verifiable then equity finance is not possible
and the only feasible contract involves a fixed payment D with the bank seizing the
entrepreneur’s assets if the payment is not made. Despite the publicity attracted by
9Gibson and Sanbonmatsu (2004) find evidence that optimists (as measured by a personality test)
persist longer than pessimists in the face of gambling losses and eventually lose more money. This suggests
that optimists may wait too long before closing failing businesses.
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venture capitalists, empirically, the role of equity in startups is very limited (Bank of
England, 2001).
Entrepreneurs post their wealth W (< K) as collateral.10 If the project fails, the
entrepreneur forfeitsW minus x, the statutorily protected assets.11 Banks do not observe
individuals’ types but do know the frequency distribution of types. If the bank oﬀers a
loan, it demands a repayment D if the project succeeds and seizes W − x(< D) if the
entrepreneur defaults.
The model is solved explicitly in the Appendix. Here the key properties of the model
and their implications are summarised and discussed.
(i) Given D, the substitution eﬀect implies that eﬀort is increasing in optimism. So
more optimistic individuals are more likely to succeed, but not to the extent that they
believe they will.
(ii) Borrowers’ eﬀort is decreasing in the level of protected assets since the stick for
failure is then less severe.
(iii) The higher is D the lower is eﬀort since the carrot for success is then smaller.
This is the familiar moral hazard eﬀect. Note though that optimism oﬀsets the eﬀort
damping of a positive D. It is possible that the more optimistic types supply more than
the eﬃcient level of eﬀort.
(iv) The decision to apply for a loan depends on whether the borrowers expected utility
evaluated at the subjective probabilities, SU, exceeds non-entry utility,W. Hence, there is
a threshold level of optimism above which a loan is applied for.
(v) Beyond some level, further increases in D reduce the expected bank revenue per
loan, R. This is due to the moral-hazard eﬀect. Oﬀsetting this is the advantageous
selection resulting from the least optimistic and hence lowest eﬀort types dropping out
as D increases. Given the functional forms chosen here, R reaches a maximum which is
increasing in W and a.
(vi) There is a critical value of W below which, whatever D is chosen, banks cannot
earn enough revenue to cover the competitive return on deposits. These borrowers are
redlined. If a varies across individuals and is observable then the redlined groups will be
those with wealth/ability combinations below some threshold.
(vii) Although there is a threshold wealth below which a group is redlined, above this
level it is ambiguous whether entry increases in wealth. When wealth is high there is less
10Equivalently, the entrepreneur invests W directly in the project and borrows K −W. Were it costly
to liquidate assets the collateral route is strictly preferred.
11Optimists would want to escape statutory asset protection by liquidating their resources to provide
maximum self finance. Suﬃcient liquidation costs make this strategy unattractive.
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moral hazard. In a competitive capital market these costs are borne by the borrower so
reduction of deadweight cost encourages entry. In addition, higher wealth means lower
at-risk lending, and as there is pooling across types, the cross-subsidy from the more
optimistic to the less optimistic is lessened. As the less optimistic types are the marginal
entrants, this discourages entry. The Appendix shows that entry first increases with wealth
and then decreases. So in a cross section of individuals, the entry rate of those with high
wealth may exceed those with lower wealth. An increase in the mandatory protection of
assets from seizure is equivalent in its positive eﬀects to a fall in wealth. Such a change
aﬀects all borrowers, so the increase in the numbers entering in the relatively high wealth
groups may exceed those exiting from lower wealth groups.
A non-monotonic relationship between start-ups and the assets the state protects from
seizure by creditors, is shown empirically by Berkowitz and White (2003), Fan and White
(2004). They investigate the impact of variations in homesteading laws between US states.
Greater asset protection increases redlining and there is an initial tendency for start-ups
to be encouraged. The latter eﬀect is attributed to the benefit of the implicit insurance
provided. This explanation fails to account for why, if utility is raised by greater asset
protection, a competitive market would not supply the optimal asset protection, at least
if, as they assume, agents are rational and well informed.
(viii) Unlike in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) groups that are redlined are better oﬀ out of
the market and welfare would be increased further were some further exclusion to occur.12
Consider a group on the verge of being redlined. The marginal entrepreneur, has SU
equal to W but, being optimistic, their objective utility is below W . The intramarginal
entrepreneurs are even worse oﬀ. This is because expected utility measured at objective
probabilities, OU, declines in λ.13 So, if a group is close to being redlined, every member of
it would be better oﬀ were they denied loans. Policies can be devised that target redlined
groups, such as loan guarantee schemes, but they are invariably designed to bring them
into the market rather than exclude them. In this model it would be unambiguously
harmful to introduce such a policy.
(ix) Policies that aﬀect all borrowers, not just those close to being redlined, are harder
to assess. Consider a non-prohibitive tax on all lending. This increases redlining and the
rise in the interest rate causes the least optimistic types from the non-redlined groups to
exit. This is all to the good, at least as long as objective utility is the criterion. The
12The criterion is the aggregate realised welfare of the group (equivalently, expected utility evaluated
at true success probabilities).
13Only realists (λ = 1) choose eﬀort to maximise OU and as optimists choose higher eﬀort levels, their
OU must be lower.
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higher D also discourages eﬀort. Normally this would aggravate moral hazard, but here
optimism may result in an excessive level of eﬀort on the part of some entrepreneurs.
Thus the tax may also improve matters on this score. As is confirmed in the Appendix,
a tax may increase the expected utility of entrepreneurs even if they receive none of the
proceeds. Perhaps of more relevance, a subsidy is not only costly for tax payers but lowers
the welfare of borrowers.
(x) Varying the level of protected assets also has mixed eﬀects on welfare. Some groups
previously eligible for loans will now be redlined by the banks. As already shown, in this
model exit is unambiguosly a gain. For groups still able to borrow, an increase in protected
assets (equivalent to a fall in wealth) increases repayments and so eﬀort declines oﬀsetting
the possibly excess level created optimism. In addition, the increase in protected assets
may either raise or lower entry, these eﬀects being respectively good or bad. Even when
entry occurs, the overall impact of an increase in protected assets may be to benefit the
entrepreneurs, as the Appendix shows.
(xi) Extending the model to encompass heterogeneous ability (unobservable by banks)
adds new insights. Start from the case of realistic entrepreneurs. Suppose that at the
equilibrium D the threshold ability level above which entry occurs is a∗. Now suppose
that some or all of the potential entrants are optimistic. Everyone that entered under
realism will still enter, but there will be some extra applicants who wrongly think that
their ability is above a∗. If optimism does not aﬀect or lowers eﬀort14 then the eﬀect of
optimism is certainly to lower the quality of lending and depress bank revenue for a given
D. Thus optimism may create redlining where it would not be present under realism.
Even if optimism raises eﬀort and does not worsen other operating decisions, the fact
that it draws in lower-ability types may create redlining.
(xii) Other things equal, an entrepreneur’s SU is decreasing in their ability. So with
heterogeneous but unobservable ability, there is a tendency for the marginal borrowers
in the pooling equilibrium to be of lower ability and hence are less profitable than the
intramarginal types. This was shown for rational agents by de Meza andWebb (1987) who
conclude that restricting lending, say through a tax, would increase aggregate surplus.
Optimism reinforces this tendency in so far as marginal types enter when it is not even
in their private interest to do so.15
Finally it no longer necessarily follows that redlined groups are better oﬀ out of the
14A function with this property is p = 1− (λe)η+1 η < −1
15If ability and optimism are inversely correlated then the marginal borrowers may be the least likely
to default. It then follows that the tax on lending should be prohibitive or else there should be a marginal
subsidy to raise quality. This is discussed further in the policy section.
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market. With heterogeneous types and realism every loan applicant correctly anticipates
non-negative expected gains, so it is strictly better that a just redlined group is funded.
Adding optimism means that many applicants have negative expected utility measured
at objective probabilities. Whether it is eﬃcient to bring in excluded groups depends on
the strength of optimism and the diversity of abilities.
To summarise the main results of the model, by inducing the relatively incompetent to
apply for funds, optimism may create or increase redlining. Granted that welfare should
be measured by expected utility evaluated at objective probabilities (or by realised utility)
the implication of optimism is that, even in the presence of redlining, taxing lending will
be beneficial and subsidising it harmful. Moreover, increased statutory protection of assets
may induce additional entry, a finding that is otherwise diﬃcult to explain, and this may
raise welfare.
4. Experimental Evidence of Entrepreneurial Optimism
Though individuals may provide questionnaire answers indicating unrealistic optimism,
their motives may be to impress the interviewer or even themselves. When it comes to
decisions with financial consequences, cooler judgements may apply. It is diﬃcult though
to draw definite conclusions from field data. Observing low average returns to start-
ups may be due to misperceptions, mismeasurement, the psychic benefit of being one’s
own boss, or risk aversion. Experimental methods overcome some of the problems. We
now summarise findings from the experiment of Coelho (2003) which allows the eﬀect of
optimism to be clearly identified.
The experiment replicates the theoretical model of Section 3 for the case of heteroge-
neous abilities except there is no explicit moral-hazard dimension.16 This is also the set
up of de Meza and Webb (1987) except their theoretical analysis assumes entrepreneurs
are unbiased in estimating their own success probabilities. Combined with the assumption
that outside financiers only know the population distribution of abilities the result is over-
investment. The experiment tests for the presence of unrealistic optimism and for whether
beliefs are even correlated with performance. It turns out that the most important source
of welfare loss is not the familiar hidden-types problem but the irrational expectations of
the agents normally assumed to have superior private information. These beliefs are so
16Subjects do not know the size of the prize for success till they have played, eﬀectively eliminating
moral hazard. Nevertheless optimism and its relation to performance can be detected although credit
rationing of the form in the model cannot arise.
17
oﬀ beam as to undermine the selection eﬀects analysed in de Meza and Webb.
4.1. The experimental design
The experiment involves three main parts: (1) subjects play one or two practice rounds
of a skill-based task (the “game”) (2) they make two sets of payoﬀ relevant choices (3)
they play the game for real. Each stage is now described in more detail followed by an
italicised commentary on the reasons for the chosen format.
• Subjects first played practice round(s) of a skill-based task for which success and
failure are clearly defined. One “project” was counting down 2 minutes within an accuracy
of 10 seconds and another was directing a hoop round a wire course without triggering
an alarm.
Setting up a business involves the entrepreneur backing themselves to succeed in a
challenge involving skill and luck. The experimental tasks embody (in a convenient form)
related uncertainties. We considered but rejected using more intellectual tasks. The fact
that business success does not appear to be strongly correlated with IQ was not the most
important reason for doing so. IQ is often entangled with ego and choices may be driven
by a desire to impress the experimenter or avoid embarrassment. Moreover, many subjects
may have a good idea of their IQ whereas at the outset people typically have a much less
precise idea of their business acumen. The trial rounds provided the subjects with partial
information and we were interested to see whether base rate neglect resulted in the pattern
of success and failure increasing distortions in the real choices.
In the next part of the experiment, participants had to make two sets of nine choices
each. At the end of the experiment, one of the 18 questions was selected at random and
the subject’s winnings were calculated according to their choices on that question.
•In the first set of nine questions (the first set of questions or FSQs) subjects were
asked to choose between receiving a prize of £8 if they succeed in the skill-based task, or
£8 with a specified probability P increases across nine options from 10% to 90%.
These questions are designed to measure optimism rather than to directly represent
business choices.17 Since the prizes are the same for the both alternatives choices should
be independent of risk preference with the skill-based option selected if the subject considers
think their chance of success is at least P . So, the P at which an individual switches from
backing their skill to preferring a random payoﬀ measures their (motivated or “implicit”)
forecast of success in the skill-based task. If subjects are optimists the average success rate
of the subjects would be below the average switching P . Even if there is optimism, as long
17Though once a business is underway choices of this sort might arise.
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as forecasts to some degree reflect ability, success rates should be increasing in the switch
P .
• The second set of choices (the SSQs) required subjects to choose between £4 for sure
or a prize of £z (£z varied from £5 to £13 in a set of 9 questions) for succeeding in the
skill-based task but with no payment for failure.
The $4 option can be regarded as paid employment, a safe option, and the £z the
reward from succeeding in a business venture. In this interpretation the business venture
requires external finance and £z is the return after repayment of the loan. Decreasing the
interest rate is represented by increasing £z. Assuming that lenders have no information
about individuals characteristics (or are not allowed to use their information), everyone
is charged the same interest rate. Given a particular equilibrium interest rate, the subjects
divide between the two options according to their switch z.
If individuals are rational there will be a threshold value of z above which the skill based
option is chosen. Those switching at higher zs are either more risk averse or consider
they are less likely to succeed in the task. Risk preferences can be estimated by using the
subjective probability of success elicited from the FSQs to evaluate individuals’ expected
winnings at the switch £z. Under risk aversion, the average winnings of those preferring
the skill-based task at a given interest rate will not be less than the safe payment. If risk
aversion does not vary with the SSQ switch point then, if beliefs even if biased, are at
least positively correlated with performance are, the proportion of those succeeding would
fall as the interest rate decreases. The diﬀerence between the average winnings of those
opting for the skill-based option and the safe alternative of $4 is a conservative estimate
of the losses from faulty decisions in the SSQs.
•Finally, subjects played the game for real. Before the FSQs were answered, a ran-
domly selected 50% of the subjects were told the overall success rate and asked to make an
explicit forecast of the chance they would succeed at the skill-based task.18 The remain-
ing subjects were told the overall sucess rate after answering the SSQs and then asked to
asked to forecast their own success probability.
4.2. Results
The subjects were 85 LSE students. Table 1 compares the average success rate on the
skill-based task with the forecast implicit in the FSQ switch points and with the explicit
forecast. There is considerable optimism with forecast of success well in excess of the
18Participants choose from ten options ranging from “between zero and one in a ten chance” to “more
than nine in a ten chance”.
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actual success rate. Although implicit and explicit forecasts averaged across all tasks
were close to 50%, this does not seem to reflect an equal ignorance principle. The means
were significantly diﬀerent according to task and there was considerable dispersion within
tasks. Moreover, the beliefs revealed in the FSQs were important determinants of the
SSQs choices.19
Average success rate 27%
Average mid FSQ switch probability 50%
Average lowest FSQ switch probability 45%
Average mid explicit forecast 47%
Average lowest explicit forecast 42%
Table 1
The timing of the explicit forecast question made no significant diﬀerence to the rela-
tion between the explicit and implicit forecasts.
To check whether subjects acted on their beliefs, the switching zs in the SSQs were
regressed on the switching Ps from the FSQs. It can be seen from (4.1) that there is a
significant relationship between subjects’ perception of their ability to succeed in the skill
based task and the minimum prize for which they were prepared to choose this activity
(with t-statistics in parenthesis).
SSQ = 11.7− 5.9FSQ (4.1)
(26.64) (−7.32)
Adjusted R2 = 0.41
To see whether those selecting into the skill based activity are those with a comparative
advantage at it, a probit was run of success in the skill activity on the FSQs switch point
(standard errors in parenthesis).
Success = −0.79 + 0.35FSQ (4.2)
(−0.39) (0.71)
19As the subjects select a probability interval we report results on the basis that point switches were
uniformly distributed within the interval (the ‘mid’ point of the interval) and also if they were clustered
at the end point least favourable to optimism.
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PsuedoR2 = 0.0024
As FSQ is not significant, the implication is that people are not at all self aware.
A similar exercise using explicit forecasts rather than implicit forecast yielded the same
conclusion. Knowing only that one individual is much more confident that they will
succeed than is another is no help in predicting which of them is most likely to succeed.
The results reported to this point suggest that there will be no relationship between
the magnitude of the prize required to tempt a subject to back their own ability and
their actual performance. Neither adverse nor advantageous selection is present. Those
choosing the entrepreneurial activity at high interest rates are just as likely to succeed as
those opting for it at low interest rates. It could be the case, though, that the extreme
observations have predictive value, but that this gets lost in the full pooling because of
uninformed people in the middle of the SSQ switch points distribution. So, a comparison
of success rates of the groups with highest and lowest switch £zs was under taken, choosing
cut oﬀs to reasonably balance the numbers, was carried out. Results in Table 2 show that
the success rates for the two groups in the table are not significantly diﬀerent and so they
confirm the lack of relation between the magnitude of the prize to back own skills and
actual performance.
SSQ switch point % of subjects in each group Success rate in each group
Below or equal to £7.5 35.1% 29.6%
Above or equal to £10.5 20.8% 25%
Table 2
Subjects requiring the highest prizes to enter the skill activity were slightly less suc-
cessful on average than those requiring smaller prizes, but the diﬀerence is not statistically
significant. Thus interest rates do not have a selection eﬀect. As neither advantageous
nor adverse selection eﬀects are present, there is no need for policy to oﬀset these sources
of market failure. This does not mean that there is no welfare issue. The general tendency
to overestimate the chance of success means there is considerable scope for improvements.
Consider the 58% of subjects choosing to back their skill when the prize for succeeding
is £8. Their average winnings were some £2.40 whereas they could have had £4 for sure.
So eliminating the option to back their skill would have made them financially better
oﬀ. Before concluding that removing the option would be welfare enhancing at least two
objections should be considered.
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i) It could be argued the subjects are risk loving and deliberately sacrifice expected
income for thrills. However, using the procedure outlined above if anything subjects were
risk averse.
ii) Perhaps the subjects enjoy playing the skill game. Of itself that would not give rise
to the observed pattern of FSQs and SSQs choices since the game is played irrespective
of the answers. There is though the possibility that subjects anticipate that they will feel
better if they win through a skill-based option rather than a random device. This would
generate FSQs switch points above explicit forecasts of success. The fact that there was
no significant diﬀerence between mean forecasts and FSQs switch points (whichever of the
two was asked first) is evidence against this interpretation. Moreover, even if the lower
of FSQs switch point and forecast is used to proxy expectations, substantial optimism
remains.
In summary, there is clear evidence that people have exaggerated views of their own
ability and act on these beliefs. Moreover, perceptions are uncorrelated with performance,
so interest rates have neither an adverse nor advantageous selection eﬀect.
5. Policy
Given that subjects make systematic errors in evaluating the expected returns to the skill-
based activity, the least intrusive intervention would be to issue a warning explaining the
error and reporting the true mean success rate. The cognitive biases that lead to the
error would though quite likely lead to such warnings being ignored. In fact information
on overall success rates was provided to half the participants prior to the choices being
made and it made no diﬀerence to the distribution of the switch points.
Discouraging the skill-based activity through taxation is more drastic. The motive
is not to curtail an externality, but because people act on false information.20 There
are at least two obvious dangers. There may be private benefits to the choices that the
researcher has missed. Even if this is not so, once the principle of paternalism is accepted
the floodgates may be released for all sorts of inappropriate intervention.
As for the first objection, it certainly only makes sense to act when evidence of error
is strong. Moreover, the existence of unmeasured benefits from entry leaves the case for
intervention unaﬀected when there is misperception of the chance of success. What is
certainly unjustified is to intervene in the “wrong” direction as appears to be the case
20In reality there are often positive externalities to start up success and negative ones to failure. It is
not clear where the balance lies.
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with present encouragements to set up new businesses. Subsidies make the recipients
worse oﬀ even before the financial cost is counted. The second objection should of course
be taken seriously but already there are many paternalistic policies around, such as the
licensing of medicines and doctors, tobacco taxes and seat belt legislation.
Given that fiscal policy is to be used to improve decisions, how in this instance should
it be implemented? Irrespective of the SSQs switch point, the subjects have a success rate
of around 30%. As private information is no help in predicting success, if any subjects
should be excluded from the skill-based activity then all should. Given the numbers in
the experiment, only if the value of succeeding in the skill activity is at least £13 are
objectively expected earnings a match for the safe alternative. Assuming that there is
no externality associated with success, if the market determined prize is below £13, to
maximise aggregate surplus it would be best to impose a prohibitive tax. For market
determined prizes above this level, even realists would enter, so the displayed level of
optimism does not yield any misallocation of activity.
Two features give rise to the all or nothing policy. It has been implicitly assumed
that tax revenue is a pure transfer. In fact raising tax revenue from other sources may be
distortionary so a rational government will choose the level of public spending so that at
the margin it is more valuable than private spending. This premium on tax revenue means
that even if entrepreneurs are objectively worse oﬀ choosing the skill based activity, it
should not be taxed out of existence. Moreover, if there is a positive correlation between
beliefs and performance, even with optimism an interior solution for the optimal tax is
on the cards. Such a tax drives out the lowest-quality types only drawn in by optimism
but higher-quality types that would enter even under realism remain active.
To see the issues, define F (x) as the cumulative distribution function of SSQs switch
payoﬀs. There is a tax of t on the actual success income z. Granted risky debt, this could
equally well be a tax per loan or on bank deposits.21 The true average probability of
success of the entrants is Π(z − t) . A conventional selection eﬀect implies Π0 < 0. The
safe payoﬀ is S and α measures the private value of an additional dollar of government
spending. Assuming potential entrepreneurs are risk neutral (risk aversion strengthens
the tax case), the policy objective is to choose t to maximise
W = F (z − t)((z − t)Π(z − t)− S) + αtF (z − t)Π(z − t) (5.1)
dW
dt
= −F 0(zΠ− S)− FΠ0z + (α− 1)[FΠ− tΠF 0 − tFΠ0] (5.2)
21We are assuming the subjects would behave the same when z=10 as when z=12 and t=2.
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According to the experimental results, Πz < S , Π0 = 0, F 0 > 0 , so if α = 1 it is
optimal to increase the tax till no subjects participate in the skill based activity. If these
conditions do not apply, interior solutions are possible. When α > 0 the benefit from a
tax is initially greater but now the premium on tax revenue means that it may be best to
stop short of a prohibitive tax.
6. Conclusions
According to psychologists, optimism is all around. It would be surprising were economic
decisions immune to these biases and this paper has surveyed field and experimental
evidence suggesting they are not. The vast bulk of public economics analyses the welfare
consequences of fiscal policy and other interventions assuming that people take decisions in
their own best interests. Hence the justification for policy is distributional or to counteract
externalities. To suggest that policy should combat self-delusion is a good deal more
controversial. The evidence reported here suggests the problem cannot be sidestepped by
supposing that misperceptions are minor or random.
Current policy towards business start-ups is to encourage them. Entrepreneurs’ unre-
alistic optimism is a reason for neutrality. A few good apples may attract all the publicity
but this should not divert attention from most of the barrel being bad. Just as Adam
Smith observed that the focus on the few high profile successes attracted too many as-
piring opera singers, so the same may be true of entrepreneurs. The issue is especially
poignant in the case of minority and disadvantaged groups. Policy makers are generally
particularly keen that finance should be channelled to people in such categories. The
analytical model of this paper indicates that doing so may create a royal road to ruin. In
the experiment reducing the prizes for the entrepreneurial activity actually increases the
subjects income.
This paper has not tried to judge whether start-ups do confer positive externalities.
To the extent that this is the case, there is an argument for subsidies even if optimism is
also present. In evaluating the case that new businesses are a good thing in themselves,
at least two notes of caution should be taken on board. A common argument, made for
example in the EC Green Paper, is that most new jobs are created in start-ups. True, but
because start-ups so often fail, a year or two down the line they are also responsible for
destroying more jobs than established firms. Moreover the failure of a business is generally
bad news for customers and suppliers, negative externalities that are often ignored.
In some respects our modelling of optimism has underemphasised its costs. First, it
was supposed that though optimists were excessively keen to set up businesses, the eﬀect
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of optimism was to increase eﬀort and so oﬀset the distortions created by the presence
of outside financiers. In fact eﬀort may rise by so much due to optimism that, despite
the disincentive of debt repayment, it ends up ineﬃciently high. There is though another
dimension by which optimismmay have a negative influence (suggested by Kahneman and
Lovallo (1993)). Once in business choices must be made between alternative strategies.
Optimists will tend to overestimate chances of success so will mistakenly often opt for
business strategies involving mean-reducing spreads of payoﬀs. They will also back options
that depend on their own overestimated skill as opposed to relying on the expertise of
outsiders. These are forces making the performance of optimists inferior to that of realists.
A second issue is risk aversion. The model assumed risk neutrality and the experiment
found this to be a good approximation when the payoﬀs were reasonably small. With
larger payoﬀs risk aversion may be a more appropriate assumption. Optimists think
failure less likely than do the financiers so will continue to prefer contracts that concentrate
returns in the success states (de Meza and Southey, 1996) but with risk aversion the cost
is that optimists are, objectively, underinsured. Policy should try to oﬀset this. Statutory
homestead laws that protect assets in the event of failure and more lenient bankruptcy
provisions in general amount to compulsory insurance. This would be an added merit of
such legislation. When optimism is taken seriously the rules of public finance must be
rethought.
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A. Appendix: Solving the model
An entrepreneur’s utility evaluated at subjective probabilities is
SU = p (H −D +W ) + (1− p)x− C(e) = x+ p (H −D +W − x)− C(e)(A.1)
= x+ aλe (H −D +W − x)− e2/2.
Maximising SU yields eﬀort
e∗ = aλ (H −D +W − x) (A.2)
with maximum SU
SU∗ = x+
µ
1
2
¶
a2λ2 (H −D +W − x)2 . (A.3)
Borrowers’ eﬀort is decreasing in the level of protected assets.
The socially optimal eﬀort level, maximising PH − C(e), equals
es = aH. (A.4)
Comparing e∗and es, notice that optimism oﬀsets moral hazard: the interest payment D
(> W − x) dampens eﬀort, but this eﬀect may be more than counteracted by optimism,
λ.
A potential entrepreneur applies for a loan if SU∗ ≥W or
λ ≥ λm ≡
√
2A
a (H −D +A) (A.5)
where A ≡ W − x. Hence, only the most optimistic individuals, those with λ above the
marginal value λm, want to enter. Notice that there is an advantageous rather than adverse
selection eﬀect of an increase in D. A higher interest rate deters the least optimistic
borrowers who have the highest default risks. Nevertheless an increase in D decreases
the eﬀort of all entrepreneurs that remain active and this moral hazard eﬀect eventually
causes bank revenue to decline in D.
Expected bank revenue from a loan is
r = PD + (1− P )A = P (D −A) +A. (A.6)
Taking into account the applicant self selection, revenue per loan is
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R = A+ (D −A) a2 (H −D +A)
Z 2
λm
λ
2− λm
dλ (A.7)
= A+ a (D −A)
Ã
a (H −D +A) +
r
A
2
!
which is concave in D, with turning point at
D∗ = A+
H
2
+
1
2a
r
A
2
(A.8)
and corresponding maximum revenue
R∗ = A+
1
4
Ã
aH +
r
A
2
!2
. (A.9)
Increasing the interest rate beyond a certain point, lowers bank revenue. This is not
due to adverse selection; as D rises, less optimistic types drop out of the market which
increases bank revenue. There is however a moral hazard problem. D acts as a tax on
returns so as it increases, the incentive to apply eﬀort is reduced so that the default rate
rises.
At the competitive equilibrium, ignoring discounting, R = K + t where t is a lending
tax. Solving this zero-profit condition for D gives the equilibrium interest rate
D(A) =
1
2
Ã
H + 2A+
1
a
Ãr
A
2
−
p
d(A)
!!
(A.10)
where
d(A) =
Ã
a (H + 2A) +
r
A
2
!2
+ 4ac(A) (A.11)
and
c(A) = −aA (H +A)−A
r
A
2
+
A− (K + t)
a
. (A.12)
Note that if d(A) < 0 there is no lending as all possible interest rates lead to a loss.
Groups with As for which d(A) < 0 are therefore redlined. It is easy to see that an
increase in x (decrease in A) or an increase in t will lead to more redlining. Specifically,
redlining occurs when
A < Ar ≡
2
81
³
2
p
9(K + t)− 2a2H2 − aH
´2
. (A.13)
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Figure A.1:
Although there is a threshold wealth below which a group is redlined, above this level
it is ambiguous whether entry increases in wealth. To illustrate, suppose H = 0.8, a =
0.5, K = 0.1, t = 0.01.For these parameter values d(A) < 0 for A < 0.0378. Potential
entrepreneurs with low initial wealth or a high level of protected assets, such that A is
below this threshold are redlined.
In this example λm(A) =
√
2A
a(H−D(A)+A) is non-monotonic in A as Figure 1 shows.
At low wealth levels, close to the redlining threshold, there is very little entry. Even for
optimists, the deadweight cost of moral hazard raises interest rates too high for entry to be
worthwhile. The number of entrepreneurs is initially increasing in wealth but drops at high
wealth levels due to the shrinkage in cross subsidy. Entry is maximised (λm minimised)
for A = 0.0815 with the corresponding equilibrium λm = 1.16. This demonstrates that an
increase in the mandatory protection of assets from seizure in the event of default may
increase lending.
Now turn to welfare eﬀects. The objective utility of an entrepreneur is given by
OU = a2 (H −D +A)2
¡
λ− λ2/2
¢
+ x (A.14)
so that the expected utility per borrower equals
x+
a2 (H −D +A)2
2− λm
Z 2
λm
¡
λ− λ2/2
¢
dλ (A.15)
= x+
a2
6
(H −D +A)2 (2 + λm) (1− λm) .
The expected net gain per loan, g, is the diﬀerence between this expected objective utility
and the payoﬀ from staying out of the market, W :
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Figure A.2:
g =
a2
6
(H −D +A)2 (2 + λm) (1− λm)−A (A.16)
The aggregate gain from lending is thus
G(A) =
µ
a2
6
(H −D (A) +A)2 (2 + λm (A)) (1− λm (A))−A
¶
(2− λm (A)) (A.17)
An increase in protected assets (decrease in A) makes banks less willing to lend. The
equilibrium interest rate increases, which reduces excessive eﬀort. Although the eﬀect
of an increase in protected assets on entry is ambiguous, as shown in Figure 2, in this
numerical example welfare is greater at higher levels of protected assets.
Turning to a lending tax, the equilibrium interest rate ∆ as a function of the tax τ is
∆(τ) =
1
2
Ã
H + 2A+
1
a
Ãr
A
2
−
p
δ(τ)
!!
(A.18)
where
δ(τ) =
Ã
a (H + 2A) +
r
0.08
2
!2
+ 4aψ(τ) (A.19)
and
ψ(τ) = −a(A) (H +A)−A
r
A
2
+
A− (K + τ)
a
(A.20)
Increasing the tax raises ∆ and lowers borrowing. The aggregate net gain (for A =
0.08) as a function of the tax is
G(τ) =
µ
a2
6
(H −∆(τ) + 0.08)2 (2 + Lm (τ)) (1− Lm (τ))− 0.08
¶
(2− Lm (τ)) (A.21)
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Figure A.3:
where
Lm(τ) =
p
2(0.08)
a (H −∆(τ) + 0.08) . (A.22)
A lending subsidy costs money and destroys utility, but a tax yields direct benefits,
as can be seen in Figure 3, and raises revenue.
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